With the constant stream of maritime decisions flowing from the federal and state courts, it can be easy to overlook some of the more significant rulings. So, I present to you, dear reader, three prominent maritime cases from the past year that may (or may not) have eluded your attention.      

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In Santee v. Oceaneering Int’l Inc. (Santee II), 110 F.4th 800 (5th Cir. 2024), the Fifth Circuit grappled, repeatedly, with the perennial question of who is a Jones Act “seaman” and thus entitled to certain beneficial remedies in the event of injury. The plaintiff, Shanon Santee, was employed by Oceaneering, a subsea engineering contractor, as a ROV technician. He was injured while working on the DEEPWATER CONQUEROR, a drillship owned by Transocean. Nearly all of Santee’s employment time during the past five years were spent working on the CONQUEROR. Thus, there was no question that two of the three elements of seaman status—(1) contributing to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) having a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in duration—were met. At issue was only whether Santee’s connection to the CONQUEROR was “substantial in nature.”

In Santee I, the Fifth Circuit initially held that there was “no possibility” that the requisite connection existed. Therefore, Santee was not a seaman; his case was properly removed from state court (Jones Act cases are typically not removable unless there is “no possibility” the plaintiff is a seaman); and the district court properly granted summary judgment against his Jones Act claim. However, Santee successfully petitioned for panel rehearing, which prompted the court to withdraw Santee I and issue a new opinion, Santee II.

In Santee II, the court found that there was, in fact, “a possibility” that Santee was a seaman. Notably, Santee II clarified that the “substantial in nature” test, as interpreted by Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, LLC, 997 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. May 11, 2021) (en banc), consists of four factors, not three as stated in the Santee I:

(1) whether the plaintiff is subject to the perils of the sea [Santee I omitted this factor],
(2) whether the plaintiff owes his allegiance to the vessel, rather than simply to a shoreside employer,
(3) whether the plaintiff’s work is sea-based or involves seagoing activity, and
(4) whether the plaintiff’s assignment to the vessel is limited to a discrete task after which his  connection to the vessel ends, or does the worker’s assignment include sailing with the vessel from port to port or location to location.

There was no dispute that Santee’s work satisfied the first and third factors. As to the second, Santee II adopted a “split allegiance” interpretation that is satisfied when a worker owes allegiance to both the vessel and his shoreside employer; only those workers whose sole allegiance is to a shoreside employer fall short. Notably, Santee I had rejected the “split allegiance” concept. As to the fourth factor, the evidence showed that Santee was not assigned to a short-term transitory task, such as loading and unloading work performed by a longshoreman. Rather, he was indefinitely assigned to the CONQUEROR and his work was critical to its mineral exploration mission. Accordingly, the Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case to state court for further proceedings.  

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In Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., 601 U.S. 65 (2024), the Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of a choice-of-law clause in a marine insurance policy. The Court unanimously held that such clauses are “presumptively enforceable as a matter of maritime law,” unless “the chosen law would contravene a controlling federal statue, or conflict with an established federal maritime policy” or “when parties can furnish no reasonable basis for the chosen jurisdiction.” The Court rejected a proposed exception that would have disregarded the chosen law when it contravenes the fundamental public policy of the State with the greatest interest in the dispute.

Great Lakes follows in the steps of Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); and Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United States District Court, 571 U.S. 49 (2013)—decisions that enforced forum selection clauses in maritime contracts. These cases frequently appear in first-year law students’ Civil Procedure textbooks. One wonders if future updates to these textbooks will include Great Lakes.
 

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The final case, United States v. Abbott, 110 F.4th 700 (5th Cir. 2024) (en banc), is not technically a maritime case, but it may well have maritime implications. In Abbott, a divided Fifth Circuit held that a 1,000 foot section of the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass, Texas, was not “navigable” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”). Consequently, the Circuit overturned a preliminary injunction that had required the State of Texas to remove a floating barrier it had placed midstream in the river to stop migrants from crossing.

The RHA prohibits building a structure or creating an obstruction in a navigable waterway without Congressional authorization or approval from the Army Corps of Engineers. A river is navigable for purposes of the RHA if it is “used, or is susceptible of being used, in its ordinary condition, as a highway for interstate or foreign commerce.” The definition is broad, and once a river is found to be navigable, it forever remains so, even if natural or artificial changes later render it incapable of commercial use.

The most interesting part of the Abbott decision concerns two cases from the turn of the 19th century that described ferries transporting cotton across the Rio Grande at Eagle Pass. A plurality of the court concluded that bank-to-bank ferry traffic did not establish navigability because trade or travel must be up, down, or along the river, not across it, in order for it to constitute a “highway for commerce.” The dissenting judges argued that the plurality’s view was based on an isolated reading of the word “highway” and pointed out that when a ferry travels between a state and a foreign country (as would have occurred on the Rio Grande), the ferry is necessarily engaged in international commerce.

About the Author...

Ben Allums
Assistant Professor
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law

Written on behalf of the Maritime and International Law Committee